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Antitrust Leniency with Multi-Product Colluders
By LESLIE M. MARX, CLAUDIO MEZZETTI, AND ROBERT C. MARSHALL
We use a global games approach to model alternative implementations
of an antitrust leniency program as applied to multi-product colluders.
We derive several policy design lessons; e.g., we show that it is pos-
sible that linking leniency across products increases the likelihood of
conviction in the first product investigated but reduces it in subsequent
products. Thus, firms may have an incentive to form sacrificial cartels
and apply for leniency in less valuable products to reduce convictions in
more valuable products. Cartel profiling can mitigate this undesirable
effect, but also reduces the probability of conviction in the first product
investigated.
JEL: K21, K42, L41
Keywords: Penalty Plus, Cooperation Policy, Cartels, Collusion, Multi-
market Contact
In recent years, antitrust leniency programs in the United States, European Union, Aus-
tralia, and elsewhere have played an important role in allowing competition authorities to
successfully prosecute major price fixing conspiracies.1 A review of the European Com-
mission (EC) decisions in cartel cases for 2001–2012 shows that a firm received a 100
percent reduction in the fine through the leniency program in 55 (54 percent) of the 101
products in which firms were prosecuted.2 Table 1 lists EC cartel cases for 2001–2012
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1“The Antitrust Division’s Leniency Program is its most important investigative tool for detecting cartel activity.
Corporations and individuals who report their cartel activity and cooperate in the Division’s investigation of the car-
tel reported can avoid criminal conviction, fines, and prison sentences if they meet the requirements of the program.”
(United States Department of Justice website, http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/criminal/leniency.html, accessed Octo-
ber 22, 2012). As Chairman of the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC), Graeme Samuel stated
that ACCC’s Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct was “absolutely vital” in the Australian government’s efforts to crack
cartels and credited it with exposing potential cases at the rate of about one a month (Beaton-Wells and Fisse, 2011,
p.379). See also Beaton-Wells (2008a, b) and Wils (2007).
2Some EC decisions apply to more than one product. For example, the EC decision in Vitamins covers multiple
vitamin products, with a separate application of the leniency program for each product. The EC’s leniency program also
offers smaller fine reductions for cooperators other than the first to apply for leniency. In 87 (86 percent) of the products,
a firm received some reduction in the fine. In the United States, an official at the DoJ has stated that, in addition to the
intial leniency applicant, as many as four firms may receive a “substantial assistance” discount on their fine of as much
as 25–30 percent. (Statements of Lisa Phelan, head of the National Criminal Enforcement Section, at the 61st ABA
Antitrust Law Spring Meeting, April 10–12, 2013, as reported by MLex, “Up to Four Companies Can Be ‘Second-In’
To Get Antitrust Cooperation Discount, Official Says,” April 10, 2013.) In Australia, only one firm can obtain a discount
under the Immunity Policy for Cartel Conduct, but others may obtain a discount under the Cooperation Policy.
1
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in which a firm received a 100 percent fine reduction.
TABLE 1—EC CARTEL CASES 2001–2012 WITH A FIRM RECEIVING A 100 PERCENT FINE REDUCTION BASED ON
THE LENIENCY PROGRAM.
Airfreight Elevators and Escalators Methylglucamine
Aluminum Fluoride Exotic Fruit (Bananas) Monochloroacetic Acid
Animal Feed Phosphates Fine Art Auction Houses Mountings for Windowsand Window-Doors
Bananas Fittings Needles
Bathroom Fittings
& Fixtures Food Flavour Enhancers Nederlands Beer Market
Bitumen Nederland Freight Forwarding Organic Peroxide
Bitumen Spain Gas Insulated Switchgear Power Transformers
Calcium Carbide Hard Haberdashery:Fasteners Prestressing Steel
Candle Waxes Heat Stabilisers Refrigeration Compressors
Carbonless Paper Hydrogen Peroxide Rubber Chemicals
Chloroprene Rubber Industrial Bags Sodium Chlorate
Choline Chloride LCD Sorbates
Consumer Detergents Luxembourg BrewingIndustry Specialty Graphite
Copper Plumbing Tubes Marine Hoses Synthetic Rubber(BR/ESBR)
CRT Glass Bulbs Methacrylates Vitamins
DRAM Methionine Water ManagementProducts
Electrical and Mechanical
Carbon and Graphite Products
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EC Decisions at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.
Antitrust leniency programs can take different forms and have evolved over time.3 One
of the key changes to the U.S. antitrust leniency program in 1993 was to allow firms to
apply for leniency even after the DoJ had received information about illegal antitrust
activity (so-called Type B leniency).4 Changes to the EU antitrust leniency program in
2002 also allowed for leniency after an investigation had been opened.5 U.S. programs
3For a description of the evolution of U.S. and EC leniency programs, see Wils (2008a, Chapter 5).
4“A company will qualify for leniency even after the Division has received information about the illegal antitrust
activity, whether this is before or after an investigation is formally opened, if the following [seven] conditions are met:
....” (Hammond and Barnett, 2008, p.5) According to Motta and Polo (2003, p.349), “The key mechanism of leniency
programs is the rule that allows firms to receive fine reductions even after an investigation is opened.”
5See Spagnolo (2008, Section 7.2.2) and Stephan (2009, p.554 and Table 4). In Australia, leniency applications are
permitted until the ACCC has received written legal advice that it has sufficient evidence to commence proceedings in
the case.
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directed at multi-product colluders include Amnesty Plus, introduced in 1999, under
which a firm being prosecuted for collusion that has not received leniency can qualify for
reduced fines if it applies for leniency in a separate product in which it is also engaged
in collusion,6 and Penalty Plus, under which the failure to report collusion in separate
products can put firms at risk for increased penalties should they later be prosecuted for
collusion in those products.7 In addition, there have been changes related to the treatment
of ringleaders, the scope for individual leniency, and the use of provisions for excluding
of certain individuals from being covered under corporate leniency.
Just as policies related to antitrust leniency have evolved, undoubtedly so have car-
tel strategies for dealing with leniency. This raises questions about cartel strategies to
undermine or even benefit from leniency policies. As stated by Wils (2008a, p.137):
[S]uccessful cartels tend to be sophisticated organisations, capable of learn-
ing. It is thus safe to assume that cartel participants will try to adapt their
organisation to leniency policies, not only so as to minimise the destabilis-
ing effect, but also, where possible, to exploit leniency policies to facilitate
the creation and maintenance of cartels. This raises the question whether
there could be features of leniency programmes that risk being exploited to
perverse effects.
In this paper we focus on the effect of leniency policies on multi-product colluders.8
The list of firms engaged in collusion in more than one product is long. Table 2, which is
based on EC cartel cases, lists multi-product colluders that have received a 100 percent
fine reduction through the leniency program in at least one of the products in which they
were prosecuted. Table 3 shows firms colluding in three or more products that did not
receive a complete fine reduction in any of the products where they were prosecuted.9
We construct a model that allows us to examine the effects on multi-product colluders
of different implementations of an antitrust leniency program by a competition authority.
We developed our model using information obtained in detailed interviews with defense
attorneys experienced in taking firms through the leniency process at the DoJ. Based
on these interviews, corporate leniency applications occur under three general sets of
circumstances: applications under Type A leniency, which means the DoJ has not yet
opened an investigation; applications under Type B leniency, which means the DoJ has
already opened an investigation; and follow-up leniency applications, where a firm being
prosecuted for collusion in one product applies for leniency in a separate product. The
division between Type A and Type B leniency is approximately 80–90 percent Type B
6See Lefouili and Roux (2012) for a discussion and theoretical model of Amnesty Plus. See alsoWils (2008a, Chapter
5.4.4).
7See Masoudi (2007, p.8).
8In what follows, we sometimes refer to “cartels” in more than one product, but these may be appropriately viewed
as components of a single overarching conspiracy.
9There were an additional 38 multi-product colluders that were colluding in only two products and that did not receive
a complete fine reduction in either product.
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and 10–20 percent Type A.10 In the model, we focus on type B leniency and follow-up
leniency applications.11
An application for type B leniency would unfold as follows: Potential collusion in
a product comes to the attention of the DoJ, perhaps because buyers of the product or
their trade association have approached the DoJ with economic circumstantial evidence
suggestive of collusion. The DoJ opens an investigation. When the colluding firms
become aware of the investigation, they retain outside legal counsel. It is natural to
expect firms to become aware of an investigation at approximately the same time because
public information would be available to all and subpoenas would typically be served on
the same day. Outside counsel contacts the DoJ to find out whether leniency is still
available. If it is, counsel starts an internal investigation at the firm to assess whether the
firm has been engaged in illegal activity, in particular whether there is sufficient evidence
to enable the firm to admit definitively to a violation of the antitrust laws. Counsel
reports the results of the investigation to the firm’s board of directors. The board will
weigh the tradeoffs between applying for leniency and not. Because this scenario plays
out in all of the colluding firms at roughly the same time, firms must be concerned that
co-conspirators will beat them in the race to be first to apply for leniency.
In all cases, firms being prosecuted for collusion are asked if there are any other prod-
ucts in which they are colluding. At that point, the board of directors must make deci-
sions related to that. If the firm denies colluding in other products, and if the DoJ later
incurs the expense to investigate and prosecute the firm’s activities in another product,
the firm would not necessarily have the option of applying for leniency in that prod-
uct, and individuals might be vulnerable to prosecution for obstruction of justice and/or
perjury.
Our model focuses on leniency applications that are triggered either by the initiation
of a DoJ investigation (type B leniency) or by the prosecution of a firm for collusion in a
separate product. Whether the cartel is successfully prosecuted depends on a number of
factors, including (i) whether the potential existence of the cartel comes to the attention
of the competition authority, (ii) the strength of the evidence uncovered by the compe-
10In the United States, the DoJ maintains the confidentiality of leniency applicants, although in some cases the identity
of a leniency applicant is available through other sources. In Europe, EC decisions in cartel cases identify leniency
applicants. A review of these cases shows that the percentage of cases in which a firm applies for leniency prior to the
start of an investigation by the EC is greater than the 10-20% indicated for the United States. However, in many of these
cases, it may be that the firm was applying for leniency in Europe as a response to an investigation in the United States.
According to Bloom (2007), roughly half of the leniency applications received by the EC follow leniency applications in
the United States: “One important factor that is likely to lead to an overestimate of the success of the EC leniency program
is where applications to the Commission either followed on from those to the US Department of Justice (DOJ) or were
simultaneous. The prime aim of any applicant is normally to avoid US criminal sanctions. But once a US investigation is
stimulated by an amnesty application, other authorities will start investigations as they become aware at some stage of the
US one. Hence applications need to be made simultaneously to other authorities or as soon as possible after one to the
DOJ. It is the US powers rather than the EC (or other jurisdiction) powers which drive these applications. However, if the
applicants could not secure leniency in the EC as well as the US it is highly likely that a significant proportion of them
would not apply for US amnesty as they would not be able to avoid heavy EC fines. In approaching half of the EC cases
from 2000 there was a prior or simultaneous application for amnesty under the US program.” (Bloom, 2007, pp.8–9).
11An application for type A leniency would unfold as in the case of type B leniency, except that events are typically
triggered when the involvement of the firm in potentially illegal activity comes to the attention of an employee, who
would typically report the concerns to the firm’s general counsel, who decides whether to bring in outside counsel to
investigate.
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tition authority’s investigation, and (iii) whether cartel members apply for leniency. If
more than one cartel member applies for leniency, then only one, chosen at random, is
designated as receiving leniency. If a cartel is successfully prosecuted, cartel members
not covered by the leniency policy are fined.
We show that leniency programs enhance the detection of cartels but that the incen-
tives for leniency application and hence the probability of successful prosecutions can
be affected by linkages across markets in the antitrust leniency program. Specifically,
in our model a penalty-plus antitrust leniency program that asks firms convicted of col-
lusion to attest to whether or not they are colluding in any other product markets can
increase leniency applications in the first product investigated but reduce the probability
of prosecution in the other products. It is possible that such a linkage in the leniency
program creates incentives for firms to form sacrificial cartels and apply for leniency in
small products where penalties would be limited in order to reduce the probability of
conviction in larger, more valuable products. We show that these undesirable effects can
be mitigated by cartel profiling, that is by increasing the probability of investigation for
other products produced by firms found to be engaged in collusion. At the same time,
by reducing the incentives of firms to apply for leniency in the first product under in-
vestigation for collusion, cartel profiling reduces the probability of conviction in the first
product investigated. In addition, in our model the effectiveness of leniency programs
for detecting cartels is improved if there is a greater likelihood that firms’ internal inves-
tigations into possible antitrust offenses will be successful, which suggests there is value
in policies that enhance cooperation by employees and facilitate the discovery of incrim-
inating evidence. We consider implications for the allocation of antitrust enforcement
resources and show that resources directed at investigations and prosecutions are strate-
gic complements for generating convictions and that resources must be devoted to both
investigation and prosecution in order for a leniency program to be effective in terms of
improving detection and deterrence of cartels.
In Section I, we discuss related literature. In Section II, we present the model and
provide a benchmark result for the case without a leniency program. In Section III we
identify the continuation equilibrium in the second market under investigation, while in
Section IV we derive the full equilibrium for both a standard leniency and a penalty-plus
leniency program. Section V contains the main policy insights of the paper. Section VI
concludes and argues that our model and its insights have wider applicability, as they
apply to any situation where a group of agents in a coalition (e.g., a criminal organi-
zation or gang) face an external threat to the stability of their relationship (e.g., by law
enforcement).
I. Literature
There is a substantial economics literature on antitrust leniency.12 The theoretical liter-
ature, including Spagnolo (2000, 2004), Motta and Polo (2003), Buccirossi and Spagnolo
(2005, 2006), Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic (2006), Chen and Harrington (2007), Harrington
12For surveys, see Rey (2003) and Spagnolo (2008). See also Wils (2008a, Chapter 5).
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(2008), Lefouili and Roux (2012), Chen and Rey (2013), and Choi and Gerlach (2013),
has focused on repeated games models and on the self-enforcement of a cartel structure.
The collusive behavior is supported as an equilibrium in a supergame without need for
communication and without interfirm transactions.13 In the context of these models, one
can analyze how the range of discount factors or the range of collusive payoffs under
which collusion can be supported is affected by various implementations of leniency
programs. These papers provide important insights related to the optimal design of le-
niency programs. In general, they suggest that the introduction of a leniency program
makes it more difficult for firms to support collusion, although they recognize that to the
extent that leniency programs reduce expected fines, they may reduce deterrence.
A different approach is taken by Harrington (2013), who considers the case of a cartel
that has ended, so deviations from the collusive agreement are no longer an issue, but
where the threat remains that firms might disclose the cartel to authorities and apply for
leniency. Harrington (2013) assumes, as we do, that the firms face uncertainty over the
probability that the cartel will be discovered and prosecuted in the absence of a leniency
applicant, but his model differs in many ways from ours. Other approaches are taken
by Brisset and Thomas (2004), who provide an auction-based model, and Motchenkova
(2004), who considers an optimal stopping model. Angelucci and Han (2012) consider
the interaction of leniency with the within-firm principal-agent problem. For empiri-
cal analysis of leniency, see Stephan (2009), Miller (2009), Sokol (2012), and Zhou
(2012), and for experimental results, see Hinloopen and Soetevent (2008) and Bigoni et
al. (2012a, b).
The literature has also addressed the potential for the strategic use of leniency by car-
tels. The potential benefits to a cartel from explicitly including leniency applications in
their collusive strategy in order to obtain the benefits of reduced fines are considered by
Motta and Polo (2003), Spagnolo (2004), Chen and Harrington (2007), and Chen and
Rey (2013). This literature suggests that generous leniency programs may be exploited
by cartels.
Our approach differs in two fundamental ways from the existing literature. First, we
are interested in understanding the incentive to be the first firm to apply for leniency after
an investigation has been started by the competition authority. To do so, we abstract from
dynamic self-enforcing constraint and use instead a modeling approach based on global
games to solve the coordination game induced by a leniency program.14 Second, our
focus is on multi-product colluders.15
Coordination games commonly result in multiple equilibria. For example, if a firm
expects its co-conspirator to apply for leniency, then the firm expects to be prosecuted,
so it would typically have an incentive also to apply, hoping to be first in the door and
avoid paying a fine. But if a firm expects that its co-conspirators will not apply for le-
niency, then it may be a best response also not to apply if that allows collusive profits
13See Green, Marshall, and Marx (2014) for a discussion of the role of communication in supporting collusion.
14Often colluding firms are able to set up the necessary structures to control secret deviations, such as the pricing
allocation, and enforcement structures outlined by Stigler (1964). For further discussion of collusive structures, see
Marshall and Marx (2012, Chapter 6).
15See Choi and Gerlach (2012) on the effects on multi-product cartels of demand linkages among products.
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to continue. The theory of global games has shown that often the existence of multiple
equilibria relies on common knowledge of payoffs, but that if players have private infor-
mation, the equilibrium is unique (see Carlsson and van Damme (1993a, b) and Morris
and Shin (2002)). The theory of global games presents a natural way to look at the issue
of leniency, where each player has two main strategies and where it is natural to view
the probability of conviction as not being common knowledge, but known with error by
the firms in a cartel. Although the coordination game aspect of leniency applications
typically generates multiple equilibria and is a key issue in studying the effects of le-
niency programs, the global games approach allows us to identify a unique Bayesian
equilibrium that survives iterated elimination of dominated strategies.
II. Model
We consider two symmetric firms that have chosen to form an illegal cartel in each of
two markets.16 Consistent with the U.S. experience, we focus on leniency applications
that happen after the cartel is under investigation by the competition authority (type B
leniency). If a firm comes under investigation by the competition authority in one of
the two markets, the firm’s board of directors brings in outside counsel to do an internal
investigation. Such an investigation leaves open the possibility that insufficient evidence
is uncovered to support a leniency application even though a cartel was, in fact, active.
This is especially true because the ability of a firm’s outside antitrust counsel to uncover
evidence of collusion depends on the cooperation of managers with knowledge of the
conspiracy, whose interest may be to avoid detection.17 Furthermore, firms that offer
cartel management services provide counseling on avoiding detection and the mainte-
nance of incriminating documents at a site out of the reach of key antitrust authorities,
making detection more difficult.18
If the internal investigation does not uncover evidence that would allow a leniency
application, which happens with probability 1  , then there is no option of applying
16We discuss later how our results could be extended to more general settings where firms are not symmetric, there
are more than two firms, and the cartels in the two markets are composed by different firms; see footnotes 23 and 25.
17By cooperating, a manager promotes the prosecution of the cartel, which would potentially leave the manager labeled
as someone who has engaged in illegal price fixing, fired from his or her current position, and have severe future career
consequences. Furthermore, if a manager cooperates, the firm may not get leniency, or if it does, that manager may be
“carved out” by the antitrust authority from the corporate leniency agreement and so face criminal prosecution.
18For example, colluding firms might expend resources to engage a third party facilitator for the cartel that could
manage incriminating evidence. The EC Decision in Organic Peroxides, states that the cartel maintained certain doc-
uments at the premises of the consulting firm AC Treuhand in Switzerland: “[AC Treuhand] produced, distributed and
recollected the so called ‘pink’ and ‘red’ papers with the agreed market shares which were, because of their colour, easily
distinguishable from other meeting documents and were not allowed to be taken outside the AC Treuhand premises.” (EC
Decision inOrganic Peroxides at par. 92(b)) In addition, AC Treuhand “reimbursed the travel expenses of the participants,
in order to avoid traces of these meetings in the companies’ accounts” (par. 92(d)) and “instructed all participants on the
legal dangers of parts of these meetings and on what measures to take to avoid detection of these arrangements’ bearing
on Europe.” (par. 92(j)) One would expect this type of strategy to reduce the ability of cartel firms to be able to produce
sufficient evidence to qualify for leniency. In Organic Peroxides, there were leniency applications: “[Peroxid Chemie]
and Laporte [later Degussa] provided in their submission the original of the initial main agreement of 1971, which they
obtained from AC Treuhand while preparing the leniency application. It was printed on pink paper, as were other con-
fidential cartel documents which were not allowed to be taken out of the premises of AC Treuhand.” (EC Decision in
Organic Peroxides at par.83) (http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec_docs/37857/37857_100_1.pdf)
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for leniency. If the internal investigation at firm i related to product j does uncover
evidence, which happens with probability  then the investigation also provides outside
counsel with a signal  i j as to the probability  j that the cartel would be prosecuted in the
absence of any leniency applicant. Outside counsel then advises the board of directors on
next steps and the board of directors makes the choice between applying for leniency or
not. At the time of this choice, the board does not knowwhether the internal investigation
at the other firm has uncovered evidence sufficient to allow a leniency application by that
firm, or if it has, what choice was made by the other firm.
We assume the firms are symmetric and that  j is each firm’s payoff in product j 
1 2 when it does not apply for leniency and is not prosecuted. A firm’s payoff when it
is successfully prosecuted and fined (with no leniency granted) is  f  j . We let  j
be the payoff when granted leniency in product j , where   f , so that the payoff is
higher than when prosecuted without applying for leniency.19 Payoffs are summarized
in Table 4.
The timeline is as follows:
1) In the first round, which focuses on product 1, the following leniency game is
played for product 1:
a) In the first stage, both firms observe signal s1  0 1 where Pr s1  1 
h  0 1. The realization s1  1 denotes that the competition authority has
received some evidence about illegal antitrust activity in product 1 and has
started an investigation, while s1  0 means that this has not happened.
b) In the second stage, nothing happens if s1  0, but if s1  1 each firm
brings in outside counsel to do an internal investigation. The internal inves-
tigation uncovers evidence sufficient to support a leniency application with
probability   0 1, in which case the outside counsel observes a condi-
tionally independent random variable  i1 uniformly distributed in the interval
[ 1    1  ]  where   0 centered on the realized value of the random
variable  1, defined below in (d). We will think of  as “small”, so that  is
“almost” perfectly observed by each firm and focus on the limit as   0.20
c) In the third stage, nothing happens if s1  0 or if s1  1 and the inter-
nal investigation did not uncover evidence sufficient to support a leniency
application. But if s1  1 and the internal investigation did uncover such ev-
idence, then the outside counsel advises the board of directors by reporting
19In the United States, firms receiving leniency may still be subject to penalties from civil litigation; however, exposure
to those penalties is reduced for successful leniency applicants. “Under the Antitrust Criminal Penalty Enhancement and
Reform Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-237, Title 2, §§ 211-214, 118 Stat. 661, 666-668, a leniency applicant may qualify
for detrebling of damages if the applicant cooperates with plaintiffs in their civil actions while the applicant’s former
co-conspirators will remain liable for treble damages on a joint and several basis.” (Hammond and Barnett, 2008, p.18.)
20As described in Carlsson and van Damme (1993a), the global game result that iterated dominance forces each player
to select the risk-dominant equilibrium of the game corresponding to his observation provided that  is sufficiently small
relies only on the posterior beliefs being approximately symmetric (the likelihood that i assigns to j observing  j1 given
 i1 is approximately equal to the likelihood that j assigns to i observing  i1 given  j1). Symmetry holds exactly if the
prior is uniform but holds approximately for general priors if the observation errors are small.
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the observed value  i1 and the board decides whether to apply for leniency or
not. If only one firm applies for leniency, it receives leniency. If both firms
apply for leniency, one (and only one) is randomly designated as receiving
leniency.
d) In the fourth stage, the competition authority concludes its investigation after
observing an additional signal 1  0 1 indicating the strength of the case;
1  1 signifies that the authority has enough evidence to convict the firms,
while 1  0 denotes insufficient evidence and the need to drop the case. We
assume that 1  1 if there is at least one leniency applicant. If there is no
leniency applicant, Pr 1  1  s1  0  0 and Pr 1  1  s1  1   1.
From the point of view of the firms,  1 is a random variable with positive,
bounded density g 1 and distribution G  1 with support on the interval
0 1; let  E 
 1
0 g  d be the expected value of  1.
2) In the second round, which focuses on product 2, we need to distinguish between
penalty-plus and standard leniency. Under standard leniency, except for the prob-
ability that the competition authority starts an investigation, the same game as in
the first round is played for product 2. We let the probability that the competi-
tion authority starts an investigation to be hC  h if in the first round firms were
convicted, i.e., if 1  1 and h otherwise. This reects “cartel profiling”; that is,
the conviction in product 1 may cause the competition authority to be more atten-
tive to the potential for collusion in other products produced by the same firms,
increasing the probability of an investigation in product 2.21
Under penalty-plus leniency, if 1  0 then the game played for product 2 is the
same as the game for product 1; but if 1  1 then a penalty-plus game is played
for product 2, in which firms prosecuted in product 1 are asked about potential col-
lusion in product 2 and must decide whether to apply for leniency without having
observed the signal s2 (i.e., without knowing whether the competition authority
has received evidence about illegal antitrust activity). Firms that deny any involve-
ment in a collusive agreement in product 2 are not allowed to apply for leniency
at a later stage; e.g., after the competition authority has started an investigation.22
Formally, the penalty-plus game has four stages:
a) In the first stage, each firm brings in outside counsel to do an internal inves-
tigation. The internal investigation uncovers evidence sufficient to support a
leniency application with probability   0, in which case the outside coun-
sel observes a conditionally independent random variable  i2 centered on the
realized value of the random variable  2, which, for simplicity, has the same
density and support as  1.
21“The [Antitrust] Division [of the DoJ] will target its proactive efforts in industries where we suspect cartel activity
in adjacent markets or which involve one or more common players from other cartels.” (Hammond, 2004, p.15)
22Because, as we shall prove in Proposition 2, firms never apply for leniency in the second product under penalty-plus
leniency, if we allowed firms to apply for leniency after an investigation has started, then penalty-plus leniency would be
equivalent to standard leniency.
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b) In the second stage, if the internal investigation uncovered evidence sufficient
to support a leniency application, then the board decides whether to apply for
leniency or not.
c) In the third stage, if no firm has applied for leniency, then the competition
authority receives evidence about illegal antitrust activity, s2  1 with prob-
ability hC .
d) In the fourth stage, the competition authority concludes its investigation after
observing the additional signal 2  0 1. As in the first round,  2 
Pr 2  1  s2  1.
In the benchmark case without a leniency program in place, the cartel is convicted in
the first product with probability N1  h E and in the second product with probability




h E . A cartel firm’s expected payoff in product i is V Ni  i 
where V Ni  1Ni Ni f .
We will use the following three assumptions to reduce the number of cases we need to





2 f  
2 1 
2 f    2h

2 1 f   E










 f  
22  1 f  
Assumption A3:
E [    t]  1 t
2

Assumption A1 puts an upper bound on the value that  can take. Note that it implies
that
(1)   2 1 
2 f  
Indeed, most of our results only require that condition (1) holds. The full force of As-
sumption A1 is only needed in Proposition 4 (and Lemma 3), to guarantee that under a
penalty-plus program for some parameter values it is optimal for firms not to apply for
leniency in the first product.
Assumption A2 puts an upper bound on the probability hC , and consequently h, that
the competition authority acquires evidence of collusion on its own. It will be used in
Proposition 2 to show that firms never apply for leniency when the penalty-plus leniency
game is played in product 2 after a conviction in product 1.
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Assumption A3 is a restriction on the right tail of the distribution of  ; note that it
is satisfied by the uniform and other common distributions. Assumption A3 is used to
prove Lemma 2, parts (i i) and (i ii), and Lemma 3.
III. Second product equilibrium
Using backward induction, we begin by considering the second product coming to
the attention of the competition authority. We need to distinguish the standard leniency
setting from the case of penalty-plus leniency after a first period conviction. The differ-
ence between the two is that after a conviction in the first-market, under penalty plus a
firm must decide whether to apply for leniency before the competition authority starts an
investigation.
In both cases, firms must decide whether to apply for leniency after having conducted
an internal investigation. If a firm does not uncover evidence, then it has no choice to
make; it cannot apply for leniency. After uncovering evidence, a firm faces a strategic
game (the basic leniency game). The firm (the row player) must decide whether to apply
for leniency (L) or not (N ) and its payoff depends on whether the other firm (the column
player) applies for leniency in case it has uncovered evidence. The payoff of the row







2  f   2  f  
N 1  1  i2 2 1 f  1  i2 2 1 f 
The perceived probability of successful prosecution in case of no leniency application
is  i2 where   1 in the case of standard leniency or penalty-plus without a first
market conviction (because in those cases the firms only decide whether to apply for le-
niency after having observed that the competition authority has started an investigation),
and where   hC in the case of penalty-plus after a conviction in the first market (be-
cause in this case firms must decide whether to apply for leniency before the competition
authority starts an investigation, which will happen with probability hC ).
We can think of  f 2, the firm’s payoff when prosecuted and fined, as the baseline
payoff of the row player. If the row player applies for leniency, then it receives leniency
and a payoff of 2  f   above the baseline if the other firm does not apply after
uncovering evidence (upper right cell). It receives leniency and a payoff of 2  f  
above the baseline with probability 1  2 if the other firm does apply after uncovering
evidence (upper left cell). This is because the only event in which the applying firm
does not receive leniency is when the other firm uncovers evidence (which occurs with
probability ), applies, and is selected to receive leniency by the random draw (which
occurs with probability 12 ).
When the row player does not apply for leniency, it is not prosecuted and receives a
23The symmetry of firms does not play any role in the game; we could replace 2 with a different payoff 2i for each
firm i without affecting the analysis.
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payoff of 2 1 f  above the baseline  f 2 with probability 1   i2 if the other
firm does not apply after uncovering evidence (lower right cell) and with probability
1 1  i2 if the other firm applies for leniency after uncovering evidence (lower
left cell).
Based on the basic leniency game, we can distinguish between the following four
cases:
1) Applying for leniency is a strictly dominant strategy and L  L is the unique Nash
equilibrium. This holds if and only if




2) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria L  L and N N and equilibrium
L  L is risk dominant. Because the basic leniency game is symmetric, L  L is
risk dominant if L is the best reply to the opponent’s strategy of randomizing with





  f  




3) There are two pure strategy Nash equilibria L  L and N N and N N  is risk





  f  




  f  
22  1 f  
4) No leniency is a dominant strategy and N N  is the unique Nash equilibrium.
This holds if and only if




  f  
21  1 f  
We see from condition (3) that if the punishment for being convicted without a leniency
application is sufficiently severe, i.e., f is sufficiently large, then applying for leniency is
a dominant strategy, as long as being convicted is possible, i.e.,  i2  0. Large values of
f may be appropriate if, for example, colluding firms can be held jointly and severally
liable or damages tripled or to account for prison sentences for managers.
We see from condition (6) that, without enough probability  i2 that the competition
authority prosecutes the cartel in the absence of a leniency application, it is a dominant
strategy for firms not to apply for leniency. This provides a modeling foundation for the
view that for leniency to work it is important that, in the words of Wils (2008a, p.130),
“the companies and individuals concerned perceive a risk that the competition authorities
will detect and establish the antitrust violation without recourse to leniency.”
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When there is a threat of prosecution in the absence of a leniency application, the
threat that a co-conspirator may apply increases leniency applications. If it were known
that the rival could not apply for leniency, perhaps because it would be viewed as a
ringleader or coercing others to join and so not eligible for leniency, then the firm applies
for leniency if and only if  i2  11 f . However, as shown below, with the threat that
a co-conspirator may apply, a firm applies for leniency for the larger range of values
 i2  11 f 
 f
221 f  . Thus, a “race to the courthouse” can amplify the incentive for
a colluding firm to apply for leniency.
A. Standard leniency in the second product
Because we are interested in the case of a small error in the observation by firm i of the
probability of successful prosecution,  i2 is approximately equal to  2. Assumption A1
guarantees that in the case of standard leniency, or penalty-plus with no prior conviction,
when   1, the parameter configuration does not rule out any of the four equilibrium
cases. For high values of  2 the leniency program is certainly effective and for low values
of  2 the leniency program is ineffective; more formally, (3) holds for  i2 sufficiently
close to one and (6) holds for  i2 sufficiently close to zero because by Assumption A1
inequality (1) holds and, as a result, the right side of (6) is positive.
We can think of the signal  i2 received by firm i as i’s type. The strategy of firm i can
then by represented as the probability i2  i2 with which the firm chooses pure strategy
L after observing signal  i2. Define the cut-off value for the probability of prosecution
below which N N is risk dominant and above which L  L is risk-dominant in the
basic leniency game by:
(7)  2  1
4   f  
22  1 f   0
We are now in a position to prove the following result, which exploits the fact that  2 is
a random variable that is imperfectly observed by the firms. The proof is contained in
Appendix A, as are all other proofs.
PROPOSITION 1: Under Assumption A1, with standard leniency or penalty-plus with
no prior conviction, in the basic leniency game for product 2, for  sufficiently small,
the subgame taking place after a signal s2  1 has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that
survives the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. In such an equilibrium,
when firm i uncovers evidence, it applies for leniency (i.e., i2  i2  1) if it receives a
signal  i2   2, and does not apply (i.e., i2  i2  0) if it receives a signal  i2   2.
As Proposition 1 shows, depending on the signals firms receive, firms for which le-
niency is feasible may choose to apply for leniency or may not. Henceforth, when com-
puting payoffs and probabilities of successful prosecution, we take the limit as   0,
with the implication that the firms coordinate on either both applying for leniency when
that is feasible or both not applying for leniency.
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The ex ante probability that the cartel will be convicted in the basic leniency game is:
(8) S2i  h2

1 1 21  E  2 
 2
0
1  g   d


where h2  h and S2i  S2B if there was no conviction in product 1, while h2  hC
and S2i  S2C otherwise. To understand this expression, note that, conditional on the
competition authority acquiring evidence, which occurs with probability h2, the cartel is
not convicted if neither firm finds evidence to apply for leniency and then the competition
authority is unable to convict, which occurs with probability 121 E – the second
term in the square brackets – or if at least one firm finds evidence (probability 2 )
but  is less than  2 and the authority is unable to convict – the last term in the square
brackets.
The expected payoff of a cartel firm from a basic leniency game in product 2 is V S2i2
where













where V S2i is denoted as V S2B or V S2C depending on whether h2  h or h2  hC . Note that
a firm gets 2 with probability 1S2i and a baseline payoff of  f 2 with probability







   2

), which generates the last term in (9).
The next lemma follows from hC  h.
LEMMA 1: Under Assumption A1 S2C  S2B and V S2B  V S2C 
B. Penalty-plus in the second product
If the penalty-plus leniency game is played in product 2 after firms have been convicted
in product 1, then firms uncovering sufficient evidence from an internal investigation
must decide whether to apply for leniency before the competition authority has collected
any incriminating evidence; that is, before observing the signal s2. Because hC is the
probability that s2  1, this game corresponds to the case   hC  so that  i2 is
approximately equal to hC 2.
Under Assumptions A1 and A2, for some parameter values N is a dominant strategy,
while for others it is the risk dominant strategy; strategy L is never dominant or risk dom-
inant. More precisely, (6) holds for  i2 sufficiently close to zero, while by Assumption
A2, (3) and (4) never hold.24 We may now state the main result of this subsection.
24This conclusion remains true if the competition authority could increase the fine multiplier f by a small amount in
case a firm is convicted of colluding in product 2 after having denied doing it. If f could be increased without bound, then
a firm may find it optimal to apply for leniency and Proposition 2 would no longer hold. However, in practice sentencing
guidelines restrict the ability of competition authorities to impose fines above some upper bound. On the other hand,
without the upper bound on the probability hC imposed by Assumption A2, Proposition 2 would not hold and there could
be leniency applications in product 2.
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PROPOSITION 2: Under Assumptions A1 and A2, for  sufficiently small, with a
penalty-plus program after a first-market conviction, the penalty-plus game for prod-
uct 2 has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination of strictly
dominated strategies. In that equilibrium, no firm applies for leniency, i2  i2  0, for
all  i2
Since firms will not apply for leniency, it is straightforward to compute the probability
that the cartel will be convicted in the penalty-plus game:
(10) P2C  hC E 
The expected payoff of a cartel firm from a penalty-plus leniency game in product 2 is
V P2C2 where
(11) V P2C  1P2C 1 f  
The next lemma shows that after a conviction in the first product, the probability of
successful prosecution is greater and the expected payoff to the cartel is lower under
standard leniency than in the penalty-plus regime; following a conviction, firms prefer
penalty-plus to standard leniency. In addition, as long as the probability ratio hCh is




 1, the probability of prosecution is greater and
the expected cartel payoff lower in the basic game with no previous conviction, than in
the penalty-plus game; in this case, even without a prior conviction, the colluding firms
prefer penalty-plus.
LEMMA 2: Under Assumptions A1 and A2: (i) There exists a threshold rA  1 such
that the probability that the cartel will be convicted is lower in the penalty-plus game than
in the basic game without a prior conviction, i.e., P2C  S2B, if and only if hCh  rA;
(ii) If in addition Assumption A3 holds, then there exists a threshold rB  1 such that the
cartel’s expected payoff is higher in the penalty-plus game than in the basic game without
a prior conviction, i.e., V P2C  V S2B, if and only if hCh  rB; (iii) After a conviction in
the first product, relative to standard leniency under penalty-plus the probability that the
cartel will be convicted in product 2 is lower, P2C  S2C, and if, in addition, Assumption
A3 holds, then the cartel’s payoff is higher, V P2C  V S2C 
IV. Multi-product equilibrium
In this section we study firms’ decisions in the first product after their activity has come
under investigation by the competition authority. The payoff of the row player in the first
product game is given by adding the baseline payoff f 1V2i2 to the entries in (12)
below; the second period payoff multiplier V2i is equal to V S2C in the case of standard
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1  f   1  f  
N 1  1  i1


1 1 f 

V S2B  V2i

2
 1  i1


1 1 f 





The payoffs of the period 1 leniency game corresponds to payoff of the basic leniency
game (2) with   1 once we add the baseline payoff  f 1  V2i2 to the entries
in all cells and we replace 2 with 1 in the first row, 2 1 f  with 1 1 f  
V S2B  V2i

2 in the second row, and  i2 with  i1 which is approximately equal to  1.
If a firm applies for leniency in product 1, it guarantees itself a second product payoff of
2V2i . If a conviction has not taken place in the first product, then the continuation payoff
in the second product is V S2B2. Thus, we can think of 1 1 f  

V S2B  V2i

2 as
the firm’s net payoff if it does not apply for leniency and it is not prosecuted in product
1.
We now distinguish between the standard leniency and the penalty-plus regime.
A. Standard leniency in the multi-product game
With standard leniency, after a conviction in the first product, each firm has an expected
payoff in the second product of V S2C2. Thus, in this case V2i  V S2C in (12).
Following the same logic used to derive (3)–(6), we can show that under Assumption
A1 the parameter configuration does not rule out any of the four equilibrium cases. This
is because if  i1 is sufficiently close to one, then L is a dominant strategy, while if  i1 is
sufficiently close to zero, then N is a dominant strategy because V S2B  V S2C by Lemma 1
and, by Assumption A1, inequality (1) holds. We can also define the cut-off value for the
probability of prosecution below which N N is risk dominant and above which L  L
is risk-dominant:
(13)  1B  1









where  1B   2 because V S2B  V S2C .
PROPOSITION 3: Under Assumption A1, for  sufficiently small, the model with a
standard leniency program has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives the iterated
elimination of strictly dominated strategies. When it uncovers evidence in the first prod-
uct, firm i applies for leniency (i.e., i1  i1  1) if it receives signal  i1   1B, and
25It is not essential that the firms belonging to the cartel in the first product are involved in the same second-product
cartel. The important ingredient of the model is that there is a second-product continuation payoff; that is, that the firms
in the first-product cartel are also involved in cartels for other, possibly different, products with other, possibly different,
firms.
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does not apply (i.e., i1  i1  0) if it receives signal  i1   1B. In the second prod-
uct firms conduct an investigation only if the competition authority has received some
evidence of collusion (i.e., following s2  1); when firm i uncovers evidence, it applies
for leniency (i.e., i2  i2  1) if it receives signal  i2   2, and does not apply (i.e.,
i2 i2  0) if it receives signal  i2   2
Proposition 3 shows that, conditional on the competition authority uncovering some
evidence of collusion (i.e., s1  1 and s2  1), the firms apply for leniency in product
1 with lower probability than in product 2 This is due to cartel profiling, the fact that
hC  h, which in turn implies  1B   2. The probability that some firm applies for






, while the probability that some firm







We now define the ex ante probability that the cartel will be prosecuted and convicted
in the first product:
(14) S1  h

1 1 21  E 2 
 1B
0
1  g   d


In the multi-product game, the ex ante probability that the cartel will be prosecuted and
convicted in the second product is
(15) S2  S1S2C  1S1 S2B .
The expected payoff from the first product in the multi-product game is V S1 1 where
(16) V S1  1S1 1 f 
1
2







The total payoff in the multi-product game is V S1, where
(17) V S  V S1 S1 V S2C
2
1




B. Penalty-plus in the multi-product game
In the case of penalty-plus, under Assumptions A1 and A2 after a conviction in the
first product, each firm has an expected payoff in the second product of V P2C2. Thus, in
this case V2i  V P2C in (12).
If, in addition, Assumption A3 holds, then it is also true in this case that the parameter
configuration does not rule out any of the four equilibrium cases. As before, if  i1 is
sufficiently close to one, then L is a dominant strategy, while if  i1 is sufficiently close to
zero, then Assumptions A1–A3 imply that N is a dominant strategy, as shown in Lemma
3 in the Appendix.
The cut-off value for the probability of prosecution below which N N is risk domi-
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nant and above which L  L is risk-dominant is given by:
(18)  1P  1









One can show that  1P   1B because V P2C  V S2C by Lemma 2. Furthermore, one can
show that  1P   2 if and only if V P2C  V S2B that is, if and only if hCh is below the
threshold rB defined in Lemma 2.
PROPOSITION 4: Under Assumptions A1–A3 for  sufficiently small, the model with
penalty-plus has a unique Bayesian equilibrium that survives the iterated elimination
of strictly dominated strategies. When firm i uncovers evidence in the first product, it
applies for leniency (i.e., i1  i1  1) if it receives signal  i1   1P, and does not
apply (i.e., i1  i1  0) if it receives signal  i1   1P. If firms are not prosecuted in
the first product (i.e., if 1  0), then in the second product firms conduct an investigation
only if the competition authority has received some evidence of collusion (i.e., following
s2  1); when firm i uncovers evidence, it applies for leniency (i.e., i2  i2  1) if
it receives signal  i2   2, and does not apply (i.e., i2 i2  0) if it receives signal
 i2   2 If firms are prosecuted in the first product (i.e., if 1  1), then in the second
product neither firm applies for leniency.
Proposition 4 completes our analysis of the equilibrium of the game and shows that,
conditional on the competition authority uncovering some evidence of collusion (i.e.,
s1  1), the firms apply for leniency in product 1 with higher probability under penalty-
plus than standard leniency. With penalty-plus, the probability that some firm applies













; the latter is lower because  1B   1P .
In addition, even if firms are not convicted in product 1, if hCh is below the threshold
rB , then conditional on the competition authority uncovering some evidence of collusion
(i.e., s1  1 and s2  1), the firms apply for leniency in product 1 with higher probability
than in product 2 because  1P   2.
We now define the ex ante probabilities  P1 and P2 that the cartel will be prosecuted
and convicted in the first and second product:
(19) P1  h

1 1 21  E 2 
 1P
0
1  g   d


(20) P2  P1 P2C  1 P1 S2B .
The expected payoff from the first product in the multi-product game is V P1 1 where
(21) V P1  1P1 1 f 
1
2
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The total payoff in the multi-product game is V P1, where
(22) V P  V P1 P1 V P2C
2
1





In this section we describe several policy implications emerging from our model.
A. Leniency contributes to prosecution and preemption effects
As shown in Propositions 1–4, assuming the cartel firms receive accurate signals on
the probability of prosecution in the absence of a leniency applicant, once a cartel comes
under investigation, firms apply for leniency whenever the probability of prosecution
without a leniency applicant,  is greater than a threshold ( 1B  1P  or  2), except in
the penalty-plus environment after having been convicted in the first product, in which
case the firms do not apply for leniency. The thresholds differ depending on the leniency
environment and whether it is the first or second product. In product 1, the threshold is
 1B for standard leniency and  1P for penalty-plus. In product 2, the threshold is  2 for
standard leniency or penalty-plus with no conviction in the first product, and essentially
equal to 1 for penalty-plus with a conviction because the firms never apply for leniency
in that case.
We can analyze the game in terms of the prosecution and preemption effects created by
leniency (see Harrington, 2013). If  is sufficiently large that L is the dominant strategy,
then a firm will seek leniency even if it expects that the other firm will not. This is the
prosecution effect. Firms have an incentive to apply for leniency in order to avoid the
penalties associated with being prosecuted, which for high  is relatively likely even
in the absence of a leniency applicant. If  is in the range where there are two Nash
equilibria of the complete information game, but L is the risk dominant strategy, then a
firm will seek leniency because it expects the other firm to apply for leniency. This is
the preemption effect. A firm only prefers leniency as a means to preempt the leniency
application of the other firm.
We can define the strength of the prosecution effect to be the probability that  is in
the region where L is a dominant strategy and the strength of the preemption effect to
be the probability that  is in the region where L is not dominant but is a risk dominant
strategy. Using this definition, we can examine the effect of leniency on the prosecution
and preemption effects.
PROPOSITION 5: Under Assumptions A1–A3, the strength of the prosecution and pre-
emption effects increase as the payoff under leniency increases ( decreases) (i) for the
second product except in the penalty-plus environment after having been convicted in the
first product, in which case there is no effect, and (ii) for the first product when 21 is
sufficiently small or hC is sufficiently close to h.
As shown in Proposition 5, in the environment with standard leniency, there is a double
benefit on the probability of leniency in the first product from a more generous leniency
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program, which corresponds to a lower value of , because a decrease in  results in an
increase in both the prosecution and the preemption effects.26
B. The effectiveness of internal investigations increases the preemption effect
An increase in the probability that an internal investigation uncovers evidence, ,
means that a firm that has itself uncovered evidence sufficient to apply for leniency be-
lieves it is more likely that its co-conspirator will be in a similar position. This can
increase the preemption effect.
PROPOSITION 6: Under Assumptions A1–A3, the strength of the preemption effect
increases as the probability  that an internal investigation uncovers evidence increases
(i) for the second product except in the penalty-plus environment after having been con-
victed in the first product, in which case there is no effect, and (ii) for the first product
when 21 is sufficiently small or hC is sufficiently close to h.
If it is more likely that a co-conspirator has maintained incriminating evidence in
house, then one would expect  to increase, and so as shown by Proposition 6 a firm
has a greater incentive to apply for leniency. This suggests that leniency programs can
be made more effective if the competition authority can take steps that enhance incen-
tives for employees with knowledge of the conspiracy to cooperate and that facilitate
the discovery of incriminating evidence, for example by limiting the ability of cartels to
outsource the running of the cartel and control of incriminating evidence to third-party
facilitators.
C. Penalty-plus may reduce detection
In our model, under a penalty-plus leniency program firms have an additional incentive
to apply for leniency in the first product. Conviction in the first product delivers the ben-
efit to the cartel of committing the firms not to apply for leniency in the second product
because that is the unique equilibrium of the penalty-plus game. As a result, penalty-
plus leniency increases convictions in the first product, but it decreases convictions in
the second product relative to standard leniency unless cartel profiling is so severe that
after a conviction in the first product it is very likely that the competition authority will
also start an investigation in the second product.
PROPOSITION 7: Under Assumptions A1–A3 relative to standard leniency, under a
penalty-plus leniency program: (i) firms are ex ante more likely to be convicted in the
first product, P1  S1  (ii) if hCh  rA, where rA is the threshold defined in Lemma
2, then firms are ex ante less likely to be convicted in the second product, P2  S2  and
(iii) if hCh  rB, where rB is the threshold defined in Lemma 2 and the ratio 21
is above a threshold 21, then firms ex ante payoffs are higher under penalty-plus
than under standard leniency, V P1  V S1
26See Harrington (2013) on the “multiplier effect” of a more aggressive competition authority.
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Proposition 7 tells us that in our model in the absence of extreme cartel profiling,
penalty-plus leniency generates a trade-off. It increases the probability of a conviction in
the first product and decreases it in the second product. In addition, if the second product
is sufficiently more profitable than the first product, then firms prefer penalty-plus to
standard leniency. This suggests that the competition authority has an incentive to attend
to the more profitable product first, while, on the contrary, firms engaged in collusion
in multiple products may have an incentive to manipulate the order in which products
are approached by the competition authority to the extent that is possible, potentially
engaging in collusion in a minor product and revealing the existence of the cartel in
order to decrease the probability of prosecution in the more valuable product.
Thus, penalty-plus can potentially cause more cartels to form than under standard le-
niency. In particular, minor products that were not worth cartelizing with standard le-
niency, perhaps because the incremental value from cartelization was insufficient given
the costs of establishing the required collusive structures, may be worth cartelizing in an
environment with penalty-plus leniency because the additional, sacrificial, cartels pro-
vide the potential benefit of insulating more valuable products from leniency applica-
tions. These undesirable effects can potentially be avoided by directing additional re-
sources towards the investigation of potential collusion in other products produced by
firms found to be engaged in collusion, with the effect of increasing hCh.
Other leniency policies also offer a type of commitment device similar to penalty-
plus, which can be similarly abused by strategic multi-product cartels. Chen and Rey
(2013) show that in their model prohibiting leniency for repeat offenders can reduce
the effectiveness of leniency and increase the profitability of collusion. For example,
Greece used to have the policy that firms with prior convictions for collusion could not
apply for leniency.27 In this environment, firms have an incentive to collude and get
convicted in a less valuable product to protect a more valuable one. Certain jurisdictions
restrict the ability of firms identified as “ringleaders” or firms having “coerced” others
into participation to apply for leniency. This suggests the possibility that cartels may
fabricate evidence that one, or perhaps all, of the cartel firms are ringleaders or coercers,
in order to prevent leniency from being an option for those firms.
D. Profiling may reduce detection
We have assumed that the probability of investigation is h in the first product and is
hC in the second product following a conviction in the first product, with hC  h. By
allowing hC to be greater than h we allow the possibility that the competition author-
ity responds to a conviction by increasing the intensity with which it pursues the other
products of convicted colluders, which can be viewed as “profiling.”28
Clearly, holding fixed firm behavior with respect to leniency in the first product, the
greater is hC  the greater is the probability of conviction in the second product. However,
27See Wils (2008a, p.138, n.139).
28The economics literature has analyzed profiling in law enforcement, primarily with regard to the issue of racial
profiling (e.g., Knowles, Persico, and Todd (2001) and Bandyopadhyay and Chatterjee (2010)). Harcourt (2006) points
out how profiling can have perverse effects on crime rates.
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hC also affects firms’ first-stage leniency choice. Indeed, by reducing the incentive that
firms have to apply for leniency (i.e., decreasing the range of values of  1 for which
the firms apply for leniency in the first product), profiling reduces the probability of a
conviction in the first product. As long as hC is sufficiently close to h, the reduced
probability of conviction in the first product is not sufficient to lead to a reduced ex-ante
probability of conviction in the second product.
PROPOSITION 8: Under Assumptions A1–A3 an increase in the probability hC of an
investigation in the second product after conviction in the first due to cartel profiling: (i)
decreases the ex ante probability of conviction in the first product under both standard
leniency and penalty-plus leniency, 
S
1
hC  0 and
P1
hC  0; (ii) increases the ex ante




hC  0 and if hCh  r

A, where rA is the threshold defined in Lemma




The competition authority faces a trade-off. Profiling makes a leniency application
in the first product less appealing and hence reduces convictions in the first product,
but it increases convictions in the second product. Thus, under penalty-plus, profiling
may be a useful counter-measure against concerns that firms may form sacrificial cartels
in less valuable products, as discussed in the previous subsection, in order to shelter
more valuable products from leniency applications. In general, profiling makes it more
appealing for a competition authority to start by investigating cartels in less valuable
markets.
E. Antitrust resources for investigation and prosecution are complementary
Competition authorities may be able to choose whether to direct resources towards
more preliminary investigations or towards more successful prosecutions without a le-
niency applicant. Focusing on the case of a single product (product 2), we consider a
small increase in the probability of an investigation h2 and a first order stochastic shift in
the probability of prosecution in the absence of a leniency application  2. Unsurprisingly,
both increase the probability of conviction; more interestingly, we show that resources
spent in the two activities are complementary.
PROPOSITION 9: Under Assumption A1, with a leniency program in a single product,
an increase in the probability of investigation (h2) and a first order stochastic shift in the
probability of prosecution in the absence of a leniency applicant ( 2) both increase the
ex ante probability of conviction S2i . Resources spent in investigation and prosecution




h2 , the marginal impact on the probability of conviction of an increase in the
probability of investigation.
If the competition authority eliminates resources directed at investigations, then no
cartels are identified and no firms apply for leniency. If the competition authority elim-
inates resources directed at the prosecution of cartels under investigation but without a
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leniency applicant, then there is no threat to induce firms to apply for leniency and so no
prosecutions. In order for a leniency program to be effective, the competition authority
must maintain resources directed at both investigations and the prosecution of cartels
where there is no leniency applicant.
The probability of investigations can potentially be increased through increased mon-
itoring and reporting requirements that allow the competition authority to more easily
identify anomalies. The probability of successful prosecution in the absence of a corpo-
rate leniency applicant can potentially be increased by encouraging whistleblowers (see
Aubert, Rey, and Kovacic, 2006) or allowing individual leniency applicants, although
one would need to consider whether the evidence provided by a whistleblower or indi-
vidual applicant would be as extensive or as valuable in terms of facilitating prosecution
as that of a corporate applicant.29
VI. Conclusion
The U.S. antitrust leniency program has been in place in roughly its current form
since 1993. The past twenty years have given colluding firms an opportunity to adjust
their behavior to account for the presence of the leniency program. We should expect
colluding firms to optimize given the existence of leniency. Our results point to the
possibility that colluding firms might turn to their advantage an enforcement approach
that links the availability of leniency across products for firms engaged in collusion in
multiple products. Our model raises the possibility that firms might create sacrificial
cartels in minor products in order to protect cartels in more valuable products from the
threat that a cartel member might apply for leniency.
The results and insights we derived in this paper apply more generally to any situation
where a group of agents in a coalition face an external threat to the stability of their
relationship. Take for example crime gangs and criminal organizations.
In the United States, during a criminal investigation, which may involve several poten-
tial crimes, an individual may refuse to cooperate by appealing to the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination. To combat organized crime, government attorneys
have several tools at their disposal that resemble corporate leniency. First, they may enter
into a non-prosecution agreement in exchange for an individual’s cooperation. Second,
they may agree to reduce the charges against the individual.30 Third, they may seek “use
immunity,” which requires the individual to testify or provide information, but promises
not to use that against the individual.31
It is well known that crime gangs typically require members to pass some initiation
procedure that involves committing a crime. Like applying for leniency in a sacrificial
cartel, such an initiation procedure raises the cost of defecting and is a form of commit-
ment to be loyal to the gang in the future.
29In our model, we focus on responses by firms to an investigation (type B leniency). Based on interviews with defense
attorneys, in the United States, individual leniency does not come up very often.
30This involves filing a motion according to Sentencing Guideline 5K1.1 or Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
31This involves a court order under 18 U.S.C. §§ 6001-6003.
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A number of policy implications follow from the results of this paper. We focus on
antitrust leniency, but they could be stated to apply more widely. Competition authorities
should (1) use leniency programs to enhance the detection of cartels; (2) take steps to
improve the likelihood that internal investigations into possible antitrust offenses will
be successful, including steps that enhance cooperation by employees and facilitate the
discovery of incriminating evidence; (3) avoid policies that offer avenues for firms to
commit themselves not to apply for leniency and, in general, use care when linking
leniency procedures for firms participating in cartels in multiple products; (4) consider
directing additional resources towards the investigation of potential collusion in other
products produced by firms found to be engaged in collusion; and (5) maintain resources
to investigate and uncover cartels as well as resources to prosecute cartels even in the
absence of a leniency applicant. The overarching lesson is to consider how clever cartels
will respond to the programs put in place.
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APPENDIX: PROOFS
Proof of Proposition 1. Assume that  is sufficiently close to zero so that [122 12
2]  0 1; after observing 12 the density of firm 1’s posterior about  is
(A1) g   12 
 g 
G12G12  if   [12   12  ]
0 otherwise.
The conditional density h 22  12 of the other firm’s observation 22 is
h 22  12 
 

g 22  x  12
1
2dx
with support 22  [12  2 12  2].
Because lim0 E [   i2]   i2, it follows that for  sufficiently small, if  i2  11 f 
then i’s conditionally expected payoff from L is greater than from N regardless of the
rival’s choice, so L is conditionally (strictly) dominant for i when firm i observes  i2 
1
1 f .
Letting H denote the cdf of the density h, if firm 2 plays L for 22  11 f  then firm 1
observing 12  11 f must assign at least probability



























G 12   G 12  







where the first equality is obtained by applying l’Hopital’s Rule to the expression in
square brackets and the second equality follows from g   12  0 for   12  
and the definition of g   12 in (A1) for   [12   12  ]
Let   12 be the probability that firm 1 assigns to firm 2’s choosing L. Firm 1’s













 f   2
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and firm 1’s conditionally expected payoff from N is
1  1 12 1 f  2  1  1 12 1 f  2  1   f   2
where the equality uses 12  11 f  which is less than the expected payoff from L . Thus,
N can be excluded by iterated dominance for  i2  11 f .
Let i2 be the largest observation for which L cannot be established by iterated dom-
inance, i.e., i2 is the lower bound on the iterated dominance region. By symmetry,
12  22  2. Let  be the probability which firm 1 assigns to firm 2 choosing L .
Iterated dominance requires firm 2 to play L for any 22  2, so if firm 1 observes 2,
it will be   12 . By the definition of 2 it must be that firm 1’s conditionally expected
















1 f  2
which we can rewrite as
(A2) 2  1
2   f  
2 2 1 f   1
4   f  
2 2  1 f   

2
where the second inequality follows from   12 .
Similarly, as long as  is sufficiently small, if  i2  1 2 f211 f   then i’s condition-
ally expected payoff from N is greater than from L regardless of the rival’s choice, so N
is conditionally (strictly) dominant for i when firm i observes  i2  1 2 f211 f  .
If firm 2 plays N for 22  1 2 f211 f   then firm 1 observing 12  1
2 f
211 f 
must assign at least probability 12 to firm 2’s choosing N . Let  
1
2 be the probability
that firm 1 assigns to firm 2 choosing L. Firm 1’s expected payoff from L is once again
1 2

 f   2, and firm 1’s conditionally expected payoff from N is
1 1 12 1 f  21 1 12 1 f  2  1 
2   f  
2 1  2
where the equality uses 12  1 2 f211 f   which is greater than the expected payoff
from L. Thus, L can be excluded by iterated dominance for  i2  1 2 f211 f  .
Let i2 be the smallest observation for which N cannot be established by iterated
dominance, i.e., i2 is the upper bound on the iterated dominance region. By symmetry,
12  22  2 . Let  be the probability which firm 1 assigns to firm 2 choosing L .
Iterated dominance requires firm 2 to play N for any 22  2 , so if firm 1 observes 2 ,
it will be   12 . By the definition of 2  it must be that firm 1’s conditionally expected
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1 f  2










1 f   or
2  1
2   f  
21  1 f   1
4   f  
22  1 f   

2(A3)
where the second inequality follows from   12 .
Since 2  2 and 2   2  2 it must be 2   2  2 and the result follows.
¥
Proof of Lemma 1. The proof that S2C  S2B follows from (8) and hC  h. Given that
hC  h to show that V S2B  V S2C  it is sufficient to show that
V S2





1 1 21  E  2 
 2
0















  E 1 f  2  1 f 
 1
2









Because   1 and 2  is maximized at   1 it follows that
V S2
h2
  E 1 f  1 f 
 1
2








  1 f 
 2
0









Proof of Proposition 2. The proof of Proposition 2 parallels the proof of Proposition 1
starting from the paragraph after equation (A2) and is omitted.32
32More precisely, N is conditionally (strictly) dominant for i when firm i observes  i2 sufficiently close to zero and
the upper bound on the iterated dominance region of N can be shown to be i2  1.
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Proof of Lemma 2. (i) Using (8) and (10) we have:






 h  hC  E
 h 2 
 1
2
1  g  d  h  hC  E 
The first term is positive, while the second is negative and of larger size if and only if hCh
is above a threshold.
(i i) Using (9) and (11) we have:















2 1 f  E

     2











 E 1 f 


Using Assumption A3, the first term inside the square brackets is negative, while the
second is positive and of larger size if and only if hCh is above a threshold.
(i i i) Using the definitions of S2C and  P2C in (8) and (10):
(A5)
S2C P2C  hC

1 1 21  E  2 
 2
0 1  g   d

 hC E
 hC 2 
 1
2
1  g   d  0
Using (9) and (11), we have
(A6)
























 1 f  hC 2 
 1
2







1 f  12

f












1 f  12

 2  11 f

 0
where the first equality uses (9) and (11), the second equality uses (A5), the first inequal-
ity uses Assumption A3 and the final inequality uses  2  11 f . ¥
Proofs of Propositions 3 and 4. The proofs of Propositions 3 and 4 parallel the proof of
Proposition 1 and are omitted.
LEMMA 3: Under Assumptions A1–A3, if  i1 is sufficiently close to zero, then N is a
dominant strategy in the first product game under penalty-plus leniency.
Proof. Using Assumptions A1 and A2 for the first product game under penalty-plus
leniency V2  V P2C in (12). Strategy N is dominant when  i1 is sufficiently close to zero,
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if and only if
(A7) 1 

1 1 f 













1  f   
It is necessary because it is the condition for N to be a strict best reply to L  and it is
sufficient because (A7) implies that 1 1 f 

V S2B  V P2C

2  1 f  , so that
N is also a strict best reply to N . We can write (A7) equivalently as






 2   f   21  1 f 
21 

 2 f   2 1 
21 






2 1 f  E

     2









hC  h  E 1 f 
 2
1
  2 f   2 1 
21 
Dropping the term in square brackets, we have the following sufficient condition:
  2 1 
2 f   
21 




  2  f




which, given  2  2 f21 f 
 f




  2 f21 f 

g d  0 certainly holds
if
  2 1 
2 f   
21 
2 f  h 2  1 f 

 E  2  f




Assumption A3 states that E [    t]  1t2  which implies that  E 
2 f




21 f   
1
21 f   0. Hence the above inequality certainly holds if
  2 1 
2 f    2h

2 1 f   E




which holds by Assumption A1. ¥
Proof of Proposition 5. The strengths of prosecution and preemption effects are as given
in Table A1.
We show that the prosecution and the preemption effects are decreasing in . To do
so, we show that the lower bounds of integration in the prosecution effect column of
Table A1 (the same as the upper bounds of integration in the preemption effect column)
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are increasing in  approximately linearly, that the lower bounds of integration in the
preemption effect column of Table A1 are increasing in  approximately linearly, and
that the lower bounds of integration in the preemption effect columns are increasing at a
faster rate than the upper bounds. For product 2, the result follows from Table A1 and the








 . For product
1 with standard leniency, using (13),
 1B
 

























which is positive for 21 sufficiently small or for hC sufficiently close to h, in which case




 are close to zero. The analysis is similar for product 1 with
penalty-plus, using (18). The bounds of integration in Table A1,
1V S2BV S2C 
2
1




1V S2BV P2C 
2
1
1 fV S2BV P2C 
2
1
are also increasing in  for 21 sufficiently small or for hC sufficiently
close to h. Furthermore, for 21 sufficiently small or for hC sufficiently close to h,
 1B
 
4  2 2  1 f 
2 2  1 f 2 
4 






1V S2BV S2C 
2
1





















Proof of Proposition 6. Using Table A1, it is sufficient to show that  2  1B and  1P
are decreasing in , which is straightforward to show for 21 sufficiently small or for hC
sufficiently close to h. ¥
Proof of Proposition 7. By (14) and (19), under Assumptions A1–A3,
(A8) P1 S1  h 2 
 1B
1P
1  g  d  0.
By (15) and (20),
P2 S2  P1 P2C  1P1 S2B S1S2C  1S1 S2B





where the first inequality follows from  P2C  S2C by Lemma 2(iii) and the second
inequality follows from (A8) and Lemma 2(i) as long as hCh  rA
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Finally, by (17) and (22),
V P1  V S1 







P1 V P2C S1 V S2C

2  S1 P1 V S2B2















where the first inequality follows from V P2C  V S2C by Lemma 2(iii) and the second in-




V P2C  V S2B


0 by (A8) and Lemma 2(ii), which says that V P2C  V S2B if hCh  rB . ¥






















































which is positive for hC sufficiently close to h








E 1 f   0. Hence it follows










































where the second term is positive and the first term is also positive by (A9) and Lemma
2(i) as long as hCh is less than the threshold rA. ¥
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1  g  d 
 2
0





















where the second equality follows from integration by parts. It is immediate that a first
order stochastic shift in the distribution of  , by reducing G , increasesS2i . By (A10),




and hence resources for investigation and prosecution are strategic complements. ¥
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TABLE 2—MULTI-PRODUCT COLLUDERS THAT RECEIVED A COMPLETE FINE REDUCTION IN AT LEAST ONE PROD-

















Akzo Nobel 9 2 4 3
Takeda 6 4 1 1
Aventis 5 2 3
William Prym 5 1 3 1
Bayer 4 2 2
KONE 4 1 1 2
Otis 4 3 1
Degussa 3 1 2
Merck 3 1 1 1
Samsung 3 1 2
Shell 3 2 1
ABB Ltd. 2 1 1




DHL and Exel 2 2
GrafTech
International 2 2
Kemira Oyj 2 1 1
Mueller 2 2
Siemens 2 1 1
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EC Decisions at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.
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TABLE 3—MULTI-PRODUCT COLLUDERS THAT COLLUDED IN THREE OR MORE PRODUCTS AND DID NOT RECEIVE













Roche 13 4 9
BASF 11 2 9
Arkema 6 3 3
Coats 6 3 3
Elf Acquitaine 4 1 3
Schindler 4 3 1
SGL 4 4
Thyssen Krupp 4 2 2
AC Treuhand 3 3
Barbour Threads 3 1 2
Hitachi 3 3
Schenker 3 1 2
Toshiba 3 3
UPS 3 3
YKK 3 1 2
Source: Authors’ calculations based on EC Decisions at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html.
TABLE 4—PAYOFFS IN THE MODEL FOR PRODUCT J.
Outcome Payoffs
Not caught  j
Caught and granted leniency  j
Caught and pay fines  f  j
Source: Authors’ calculations.
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conviction 0 0 Prop. 2
Source: Authors’ calculations.
